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Executive Summary
In this paper, we offer ten recommendations on how to reform American trade policy.
These reforms respond to three fundamental challenges: (1) our trade bureaucracy is
poorly designed to craft and execute a trade policy that pursues multiple important ends,
including economic and national security; (2) the domestic process through which the
United States makes trade agreements provides preferential access to certain interest
groups (capital and corporations) but not others; and (3) U.S. trade policy has failed
to grapple with the distributional consequences of trade liberalization. The first set of
reforms addresses the domestic trade policymaking process. These include restructuring
the Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), and
other agencies into a new Department of Economic Growth and Security; increasing
transparency and participation in the trade policymaking process; conducting
geographic impact assessments; and reforming the President’s powers to initiate trade
wars. The second set of reforms seeks to rebalance international trade regimes by both
conditioning U.S. trade on addressing tax havens and reforming the investor-state
dispute system. The final set of recommendations addresses the domestic distributional
consequences of trade head on, and include expanding enforcement of labor and
environmental issues, enabling domestic economic development projects particularly
for areas adversely-impacted by trade liberalization, and taxing the winners of trade.
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Introduction
In recent years, it has become clear that American trade policy needs to change. For
decades, U.S. policy has reflected the implicit assumption that trade liberalization
is beneficial for everyone, with few distributional downsides over time. But this
assumption hasn’t been borne out. Instead, decades of trade liberalization have led
to a backlash that resulted in both 2016 presidential nominees opposing the Obama
Administration’s proposed Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). And since 2017, President
Donald Trump has begun a trade war with China; raised tariffs on the grounds of
protecting national security; renegotiated NAFTA, though on terms that do not
obviously help working class Americans; and broadly called for increased protectionism.
The response to these actions has been varied—from excitement to confusion to
outright opposition.
Trade policymaking today suffers from three fundamental challenges that any reform
agenda must grapple with head on. First, trade policymakers have not adequately
addressed the distributional consequences of liberalizing trade rules over the last
few decades. Not only has trade liberalization disproportionately impacted some
communities, but these communities have not bounced back from the shocks to their
local economies. Internationally, trade agreements have meant the freer flow of capital
across borders, but without the simultaneous updating of tax rules. The result has been
the creation of tax havens around the world—tax havens that deepen the distributional
consequences of liberalization because they allow corporations and wealthy individuals
to avoid paying the full measure of their tax obligations.
Second, the process by which trade policy is made has largely been stacked to favor
organized and powerful economic interests—capital and corporations. To a degree
not found in either the legislative process or even the regulatory process, the domestic
process associated with negotiating trade agreements disproportionately gives
access to some interest groups while disfavoring the general public and even elected
representatives. It is no surprise, then, that trade deals tend to favor these interest
groups. Internationally, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures are open
only to investors, with no comparable procedures open to labor and civil society more
generally. Critics have also argued that ISDS procedures are biased in favor of corporate
interests, a perception that hurts ISDS’s legitimacy. ISDS cases, for example, are not
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decided by a standing court staffed by full-time judges, but instead by arbitrators who
can also actively represent parties in other disputes.

The process by which trade policy is made has
largely been stacked to favor organized and
powerful economic interests.
Third, international trade does intersect in important ways with national security policy
and domestic economic policy—but our trade bureaucracy is designed extremely poorly
to address these linkages. Instead of having a single department that handles trade
liberalization, trade promotion, economic security, and mitigation of distributional
consequences, our government splits these functions across a variety of agencies. This
means that there is no single entity responsible for developing a strategy that addresses
both the promises and perils of economic engagement. This fragmented organization
also works to the advantage of well-funded interest groups (and correspondingly to the
disadvantage of less well-resourced groups and the general public) by offering multiple
entry points through which such groups can capture public policy. This system makes
little sense. In a global context in which some countries use their economic power for
geopolitical purposes, international trade and economic security need to be considered
in a unified system.

There is no single entity responsible for developing
a strategy that addresses both the promises and
perils of economic engagement.
In this paper, we offer ten recommendations on how to reform American trade
policy. The first set of reforms addresses the domestic trade policymaking process. We
focus on reforms to U.S. domestic trade laws and U.S. free trade agreements, largely
putting aside much needed reforms to the World Trade Organization. These include
restructuring the Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR), and other agencies into a new Department of Economic Growth and Security;
increasing transparency and participation in the trade policymaking process; conducting
geographic impact assessments; and reforming the President’s powers to initiate trade
wars. The second set of reforms seeks to rebalance international trade regimes by both
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conditioning U.S. trade on addressing tax havens and reforming the investor-state
dispute system. The final set of recommendations addresses the domestic distributional
consequences of trade head on, and include expanding enforcement of labor and
environmental issues, enabling domestic economic development projects particularly for
areas adversely-impacted by trade liberalization, and taxing the winners of trade.
“The American public,” Teddy Roosevelt once said, “does not wish to see the tariff so
arranged as to benefit primarily a few wealthy men.” Trade policy must work for all
Americans, not just the wealthy and well-connected. Our reforms seek to do just that.
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PART I: UNRIGGING TRADE
POLICYMAKING AT HOME
RECOMMENDATION 1

Restructure the Department of Commerce, USTR,
and other Agencies into a new Department of
Economic Growth and Security
In recent years, it has become clear that the United States’ international economic policy is
critical to domestic politics, economics, and national security. First, the go-go era of trade
liberalization has reached a breaking point. A country without a strong, large middle class
is at risk of economic backlashes to international trade that destabilize the domestic and
global economy—making everyone worse off. And this is precisely what has happened. For
many years, the benefits of trade liberalization were believed either to be a rising tide that
lifted all boats or to be accompanied by transitional measures that compensated “the losers”
from trade. Neither happened. Instead, as David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson
have shown with respect to the “China Shock,” trade liberalization hit some communities
hard—and those communities had not recovered from trade liberalization policies even
after a decade.1 This dislocation led to a backlash that manifested itself in the 2016 election,
with candidates Trump, Clinton, and Sanders objecting to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Under the Trump Administration, the result has been erratic. The Trump Administration
has started trade conflicts with allies and rivals alike, often with no apparent strategy for
what the Administration hopes to achieve and little to show for it to date—all the while
creating uncertainty and economic pain for domestic constituencies of all kinds.
Second, international economic policy faces a serious threat in the form of state and
crony capitalism. Around the world, an increasing number of regimes blur economic
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and political power, using their domestic laws to advance their economies at the
expense of foreign companies, while deploying their economic power abroad for
political purposes. China’s form of state capitalism is perhaps the most notable. China
engages in an aggressive form of industrial policy in which banks affiliated with the
government offer massive subsidies to Chinese businesses. Chinese rules require
foreign companies hoping to access the Chinese market to partner with and transfer
their technology to Chinese companies. And China is investing expansively in countries
around the world—including along the Pacific Rim and within the United States—
while simultaneously protecting its domestic technological base from dependence on
foreign producers.2 As economic interdependence increases, the potential for economic
malfeasance also increases. The vectors for economic cooperation can also be vectors
for hackers and spies, or can be used as leverage points during high-stakes negotiations.

A country without a strong, large middle class is at
risk of economic backlashes to international trade
that destabilize the domestic and global economy –
making everyone worse off.
The answer to both of these challenges is not to turn inward with some kind of neoprotectionist approach to trade and international economics. The answer is to develop a
coherent strategy that coordinates trade, domestic economic development, and economic
security. Unfortunately, our government is currently not designed either to develop or
execute a coherent, coordinated strategy that includes these three issues. First, the central
programs in these areas are split across different parts of the government. The United States
Trade Representative (USTR), charged with negotiating trade agreements and representing
the United States in international trade disputes, has primarily pursued trade liberalization
and is located within the Executive Office of the President. A variety of trade promotion
agencies are independent, including the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), U.S. Trade
and Development Agency (USTDA), and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), which under the terms of the recently passed BUILD Act will be replaced by the
International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). Domestic economic development
offices—the Economic Development Administration, Small Business Administration, and
Minority Business Development Agency, among others—are split across the Department
of Commerce or are independent. Economic security efforts—particularly related to export
controls—are split across the State, Defense, Energy, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, and
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Homeland Security Departments. Each of these departments and agencies, of course, has a
different culture and different set of incentives. This makes coordination difficult, especially
if some priorities have to take a backseat to others.

We need a coherent strategy that coordinates
trade, domestic economic development, and
economic security.
The fracturing of these offices makes it difficult for the government to develop a coherent
long-term strategy. The Departments of Defense and State, for example, produce
quadrennial reviews of defense, and diplomacy and development. The process leading to
these documents allows the agencies not only to assess the current posture of the United
States but also to look forward to emerging threats and challenges. In the economic growth
and security sector, however, there are no such strategic efforts.3 Nor is it clear what agency
would be able to undertake such a task. With the intersection of domestic and international
economic issues rising in importance, it is essential that the government become better
able to assess threats, develop a strategy, and coordinate efforts to execute on that strategy.4
A better approach would be to restructure the Department of Commerce, the United
States Trade Representative, and a variety of other agencies and offices into a single
Department of Economic Growth and Security (DEGS). The Department of Economic
Growth and Security would have five primary cones, each headed by an undersecretary:
International Trade, Trade Promotion, Economic Development and Industrial Policy,
Statistics, and Economic Security.5 The International Trade cone would include the
USTR, which would be moved into the Department but whose head would retain
ambassadorial status, and the International Trade Administration (ITA). At the same
time, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DEGS would become the United States’
chief economic diplomats, a role currently played by the U.S. Trade Representative. The
Trade Promotion cone would unite all of the government’s efforts to promote American
businesses abroad: the Ex-Im Bank, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the
newly-created International Development Finance Corporation.
The Economic Development and Industrial Policy cone would include government’s
efforts to promote economic development at home, particularly its efforts to help
domestic businesses. These efforts are a critical part of any trade policy. Domestic
development efforts should work hand in glove with international trade policy. This
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cone would therefore include the Economic Development Administration, Small
Business Administration, and Minority Business Development Agency, among other
entities. The Economic Development Administration, in particular, would have principal
responsibility for administering the entire Trade Adjustment Assistance program,
administration of which is currently scattered across the Economic Development
Administration, as well as the Labor and Agriculture Departments. In addition, some
commentators have called for the creation of a U.S. Office for Industrial Policy that
would engage in targeted geographic and technological investments; such an office
or policies would be included in this cone.6 The fourth cone would be Statistics, which
would include the Department of Commerce’s various statistical agencies, including the
Census Bureau and National Institute for Standards and Technology.
The Economic Security cone would consist of a new Economic Security Agency (ESA),
which would combine the government’s fractured efforts at export controls, technology
transfer, investment controls, and other economic security policies. The ESA would
build on a 2010 proposal from then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to create a single
licensing agency for export controls, a single list of controlled items, a single coordinator
for enforcement, and a single technology system and portal for businesses.7 In addition,
the coordinator for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)
would move from the Treasury Department to ESA, as would the State Department’s
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Industry and Security would also be folded into the ESA.
A Department of Economic Growth and Security would have significant benefits. First,
the Department would be able to develop a strategy to advance international trade while
simultaneously addressing domestic economic dislocations and economic security
issues that arise from increased global economic interconnectedness, particularly with
countries like Russia and China. The Department would have a Policy Planning staff,
reporting directly to the Secretary, that should be headed by a senior economic policy
official, akin to the State Department’s Policy Planning staff. The Policy Planning staff
should be required to produce a Quadrennial Economic Growth and Security Review,
akin to the quadrennial defense, diplomacy, and development reviews.
Second, the Department would have increased status and authority within the federal
government. Combining these critical economic domains and having the authority
to both produce a strategy and execute upon it, the Department would be elevated in
policymaking, akin to the elevation of the Department of Homeland Security, vis-à-
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vis its component parts, after its creation. Third, the Department would also play an
important informational function. Because it includes international trade policy, trade
promotion, economic development, economic security, and statistical elements, the
Department will be better situated to warn Congress and the country of emerging
economic dangers, globally or domestically, than is a fragmented system of offices that
work on these issues. This reorganization thus furthers the information-sharing goal
Congress has already pursued in the intelligence and homeland security contexts, with
the creation of the Director of National Intelligence and DHS, respectively. Further, it
should afford Congress the opportunity to allocate resources more efficiently than under
our current fragmented system.
Fourth, the creation of a single Department would reduce the influence of wellconnected industry interest groups over international economic policymaking. A
fractured policymaking structure offers multiple avenues for such interest groups to
capture public policy.8 If an interest group loses a policy fight within one agency, it
can shift the fight to another agency. Prevailing within the second (or third, or fourth)
agency gives the interest group a champion within the interagency process and a
potential veto on changes to public policy. Critically, though, not all interest groups will
be able to take advantage of this fractured environment. Fragmentation favors wellconnected interest groups that can afford multiple expensive lobbying campaigns,
and often disadvantages public interest groups and the general public. Members of
the general public are already at a disadvantage when it comes to having influence in
government; when industry can lobby multiple agencies, it becomes more difficult
to develop a whole-of-government policy that is in the broad public interest, rather
than one that favors those particular groups. A single Department would include a
greater variety of interests, reducing the likelihood that any single one would capture
the Department’s policymaking agenda—and the ability of industry to play different
agencies against each other in the interagency process.
There are a number of criticisms to this proposed reorganization, but in the end, they
are unpersuasive given the significant benefits of this approach. Some critics might
suggest that the proposal is politically unfeasible given that the Obama Administration
proposed something similar in 2012.9 The Obama Administration suggested merging
the Department of Commerce, Small Business Administration, USTR, Ex-Im Bank, OPIC,
and USTDA, while moving National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
to the Department of the Interior.10 First, this suggestion did not include a serious effort
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to unify economic security operations, one of the five cones we propose creating within
DEGS, into a single place. Second, the Administration asked Congress for legislative
authorization to restructure these agencies via executive order, which created concerns
about the extent of the authority given to the Executive Branch. In contrast, we propose
that the creation of this new Department be done via statute, with Congress leading
the way. Third, the Obama Administration recommendation was justified primarily on
grounds of cost savings (they predicted $3 billion a year over ten years) and on creating
“one-stop shopping” for businesses to interface with the government. While these are
important justifications that apply to our proposal as well, the reorganization we suggest
is grounded in a far more pressing imperative: our domestic and international economic
security is at risk from the combination of the unaddressed domestic effects of trade
liberalization and international economic threats. The United States government must
have a better way to address these critical challenges.
Critics might also argue that this approach will reduce the USTR’s status and effectiveness,
and as a result will hamstring its mission to liberalize trade.11 This concern is misplaced.
First, while it is true that USTR will no longer be located in the Executive Office of the
President, the new Undersecretary for International Trade would retain ambassadorial
status, in order to preserve the Trade Representative’s (now the Undersecretary’s) status
in international negotiations. The new Secretary of DEGS would become the most senior
figure on these issues—and would be fully devoted to them at the level of strategy, leaving
the Undersecretary to conduct the actual negotiations and day to day operations. This
organization would actually elevate the role of trade negotiators within the government
and with other countries, by placing the senior economic diplomat at the head of a full
cabinet agency. At the same time, part of the problem today is that the USTR has engaged
for decades in an aggressive trade liberalization agenda with insufficient regard for the
domestic distributional and economic security consequences of those efforts. The USTR’s
work must be balanced with other goals related to trade promotion, domestic economic
development, and economic security. Placing USTR alongside these other activities will
help balance USTR’s approach—and in the process lead to trade policies that have greater
public support and thus resilience. Trade liberalization that leads to political backlash and
either irrational protectionism or erratic trade wars are worse for everyone. In addition,
this proposal has the potential elevate the status of the Department of Commerce as
it turns into the Department of Economic Growth and Security. The unified, missionoriented work of this new Department should allow it to recruit talented officials who are
interested in addressing the central economic challenges of our time.
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Another possible criticism is that the new Department will make its component agencies
less nimble, flexible, and efficient.12 In other words, it will expand bureaucracy with little
benefit. We disagree. In some cases, agencies located within the Department will still be
comparatively independent. For example, OPIC is a self-sustaining agency that does not
require regular appropriations. Its independent funding stream will continue to keep its
newly-created successor, the IFDC, comparatively independent, even as it acts in a more
coordinated fashion with other agencies within the Department. Moreover, any loss in
the speed of an agency’s action must be compared with the gains from coordination
and the benefits to the public interest of reducing the kind of agency capture that occurs
with fragmentation. The fact that the Department will now be able to engage in strategic
planning and align policies with that strategy far outweighs the possibility of minor delays
in response time arising from the need to clear responses through a larger bureaucracy.
Finally, some might argue that shifting USTR to the new Department will require creating
a new interagency coordination office at the White House, thereby adding to the White
House bureaucracy.13 This concern is also misplaced. First, the White House already has
a Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor who covers
international economic issues and is situated in both the National Economic Council
and National Security Council. This team already works on these issues with USTR, from
within the Executive Office of the President, and will continue to do so. If anything, the
new Department might actually alleviate interagency coordination problems. By shifting
these major elements into a single Department, coordination will now take place within
the Department, rather than across disparate Departments with different hierarchies.
Many decisions might therefore be resolved within the Department, without needing to
be elevated to an interagency process or to the White House.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Reorganize the Department of Commerce into a new Department of Economic
Growth and Security, which would include undersecretaries for Trade, Promotion,
Development, Statistics, and Security.
• The USTR and ITA would be included in a single Trade component headed by an
Undersecretary for International Trade, who would retain the rank of ambassador.
In addition to the existing assistant secretaries within the International Trade
Administration, the three current deputy USTR roles would become assistant
secretaries in the new International Trade cone, and would likewise retain
ambassadorial rank.
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• The Ex-Im Bank, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the U.S.
International Development Finance Corporation would form the Trade Promotion
component, headed by an undersecretary for Trade Promotion.
• The undersecretary for Economic Development would oversee the Economic
Development Administration, Small Business Administration, and Minority
Business Development Agency, and other agencies currently within the
Department of Commerce that cover these topics.
•

Require the Department of Economic Growth and Security to engage in strategic
planning and coordination across its domains, including producing a quadrennial
economic growth and security review.

•

Create an Economic Security Agency within the Department, headed by an
undersecretary, comprising the staff of CFIUS, the State Department’s Directorate
of Defense Trade Controls, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Security. The agency would also become the single licensing agency for export
controls and be empowered to create a single list for controlled items, coordinate
enforcement activities, and create a single interface for businesses dealing with
export control issues.

RECOMMENDATION 2

Increase Transparency and Participation
in Trade Policymaking
One of the reasons that trade policymaking has had significant distributional
consequences is that the process by which trade policy is made has been secretive and
exclusive. By law, the USTR creates a variety of trade advisory committees made up of
people from outside the federal government. These committees exist to give the USTR
and the president information and advice that might be relevant to negotiating trade
agreements. Although this process appears to incorporate broad public input into the
trade policymaking process, the reality is that these committees are skewed toward
corporate interest groups and their lobbyists and that most of the information they
provide is kept a close secret.

© 2018

|

GREATDEMOCRACYINITIATIVE.ORG

15

Start with secrecy. The trade advisory committees, unlike other federal advisory
committees, are exempted from having open meetings, public notice of those meetings,
public participation in the meetings, and the public availability of documents.14 Draft
trade agreements like the TPP are also classified during negotiations as if they included
important national security or intelligence information, even though by law the final
agreement must be made public before the president signs it. Indeed, virtually no
one beyond the negotiators and the advisory committees can access them during
negotiations, when public access could influence the shape the ultimate agreement
takes. In the case of the TPP, this meant that even members of Congress, who would
ultimately have been required to vote on the agreement, were only allowed to see it
in a secure facility in which any notes they took had to be left in the room. Moreover,
they were not allowed to have their staff, including staff who had received a security
clearance, review the draft agreement.15
At the same time, the advisory committees, which do have access to the text of these
agreements, are stacked in favor of corporations and their lobbyists. According to
a review of the 28 trade advisory committees by The Washington Post, “[o]f the 566
committee members, 306 come from private industry and an additional 174 hail
from trade associations.” This means that 85 percent of members are industry or
industry representatives. In total, there were only 31 members from labor unions and
16 from NGOs.16 In addition, these non-industry members are clustered onto specific
committees: only five labor representatives, for example, serve on committees other
than the advisory committee for labor issues. Fifteen committees are made up of only
private sector members. The result is that the vast majority of advice and public input
the administration receives comes from corporations and their lobbyists – not from
workers, members of the general public, or their representatives.
The results of low transparency and a skewed advisory committee system is predictable.
Trade agreements tend to work for corporate interests and undervalue the interests of
workers, the environment, and the broader public good. This is not to say that there are
not important reasons to have some degree of secrecy. For example, it would be very hard
to negotiate if every moment of a negotiation was livestreamed on the internet. Nor is it
to say that corporations should be excluded from the advisory process. Corporations play
a critical role in growing the American economy, supporting jobs, and have important
technical knowledge that is helpful to an administration seeking to determine what the
impact of tariffs might be on a particular industry. But these benefits can be preserved
even while making the trade policymaking process more transparent and participatory.
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First, the policymaking process should be made more transparent and participatory to
the general public by adopting an ordinary notice-and-comment process for initiating
negotiations on any new trade agreement. When an administration negotiates a trade
agreement, it begins with a first draft of the agreement (or portions of an agreement) that
it sends to the trading partner. Prior to transmitting this first draft agreement to a trading
partner, the administration should have to publish the entire draft or portions of the draft,
including an explanation for the provisions in the draft, in the Federal Register and accept
comments from the general public for 60 days. At the end of 60 days, the administration
would have to review the comments and publish a final draft, which would include
responses to the public comments. If, during the course of negotiations, any new topics
or issues emerge that diverge significantly from the draft that was noticed to the public,
these new topics would have to go through the same notice-and-comment process.
While current law and practice does require a measure of transparency and public
engagement, including notice of new negotiations, opportunities for public comment,
and advanced publication of the agreed text, our proposed process would significantly
increase public transparency and participation in trade negotiations. Instead of having
little sense of what an agreement might include prior to its already being fully negotiated
(at which point it is largely a take-it-or-leave-it affair), the public would have a sense of
what might be in the agreement and, critically, what the administration’s justifications are
for those provisions. It would also be able to comment on those provisions, which could
raise issues the administration had not considered and at a minimum make clear what
the flashpoints are likely to be. Most importantly, the requirement that the government
publicly justify its initial proposals in response to public comments would greatly
enhance the legitimacy of the trade negotiating process, preventing the kind of cut-andpaste economic diplomacy that has characterized much of U.S. trade negotiations in
recent decades.17 At the same time, this level of transparency and participation also allows
the administration to retain secrecy over the actual negotiations themselves.
Second, the advisory committee system should be reformed to ensure that DEGS hears
a diverse group of viewpoints. Specifically, each committee should be required to have
no more than ten percent of members from trade associations, to have at least twenty
percent of members from public interest organizations, and to exclude registered
lobbyists from serving. This reform would balance the need for detailed knowledge from
experts on certain topics and industries during the negotiations process, while ensuring
that the advisory committees aren’t solely doing the bidding of corporate interests.
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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Prior to the initiation of a trade negotiation, the DEGS should be required to publish
the draft text of its proposal in the Federal Register, with a 60-day comment period.
The DEGS would then have to respond to comments received, and would be required
to add a new comment period for any significant changes to the agreement from the
initial proposal.

•

Section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974 should be reformed to require that all trade
advisory committees have no more than ten percent members from trade
associations, at least twenty percent members from public interest organizations,
and prohibit service by registered lobbyists.

RECOMMENDATION 3

Require the International Trade Commission (ITC)
to Conduct Geographic Impact Assessments
Under Section 131 of the Trade Act of 1974, the International Trade Commission is
required to provide the President advice on the economic impact of changing tariffs or
non-tariff barriers on both industry and consumers, and when the President or the U.S.
Trade Representative requests it, to advise on the impact that trade provisions might
have on workers, employment, profits, capital investment, prices, quantities, and other
economic factors.18 Section 105 of the Bipartisan Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
of 2015—the law under which the Obama Administration negotiated the TPP and the
Trump Administration is seeking approval of its renegotiated NAFTA—provides more
specifically that the ITC must issue a report evaluating the impact of a completed but
unratified trade agreement on the U.S. economy as a whole, as well as its impact on
particular industries, consumers, and other economic factors.19
The ITC is not required, however, to consider the geographic impact that trade
provisions might have. This is problematic. As we know from both trade theory and from
empirical studies, trade agreements do not have a uniform impact across the country.
Some communities are disproportionally harmed by trade provisions and others
benefit disproportionately. The ITC should be required to conduct geographic impact
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assessments of trade provisions, when feasible, in order to make clear to the President,
the Secretary of Economic Growth and Security, other officials, and the general public
what the impact of a trade provision might be on a specific community. This will, in
turn, also allow the Department of Economic Growth and Security to allocate resources
and develop programs to target those communities with economic growth and
assistance programs.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION
Section 131(d) of the Trade Act of 1974 and subsequent bills authorizing the negotiation
of trade agreements should be revised to require that the ITC conduct geographic
impact assessments on trade provisions, policies, and any other related matters.

RECOMMENDATION 4

Reform the President’s Section 232 and
Section 301 Authorities
The Trump Administration’s trade war has been built primarily on two statutory
provisions: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962. Section 301 provides that the USTR may, and in some cases must, take
remedial actions if she determines that the rights of the United States under a trade
agreement are being denied, if countries are acting inconsistently with agreement to
the detriment of United States, or if countries actions are “unjustifiable and burden[] or
restrict[] United States commerce.”20 It also provides an extensive procedure for notice
and comment on such actions and for factors to consider in responding to these unfair
trade practices.
Under Section 232, the President can impose virtually any trade barrier he likes on
a product once he determines that importing the product “threaten[s] to impair the
national security.”21 The Secretary of Commerce is required to conduct an investigation
that includes consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other government officials,
in addition to public notice and hearings, if feasible. The Secretary’s report then goes to
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the President and if the President agrees with the Secretary’s finding, the President can
“determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President,
must be taken to adjust the imports of the article…[so that they] will not threaten to
impair the national security.”
Both of these provisions have been criticized in recent months for giving the president
too much unchecked power to start a trade war.22 In the case of section 232, courts and
commentators generally believe that because the final determinations and actions are
taken by the president himself, they cannot be challenged in court under the ordinary
administrative law rule of “arbitrary and capricious review,” which applies to agency
actions generally.23 Section 301 is reviewable by the Court of International Trade, but
courts have found that actions taken under section 301 are committed to the agency’s
discretion and therefore exempted from “arbitrary and capricious” review.24 The
justification for expansive judicial deference is that these actions involve balancing a
variety of factors and implicate foreign affairs. Given the breadth of these provisions
and the lack of judicial review, the effect is that the president effectively has unchecked,
unfettered power to start and sustain trade wars.
This system should be revised. While there have been a number of legislative proposals
and even constitutional challenges to this regime, a simple solution would be to
make clear in the statutes that the courts are capable and required to review actions
taken under these provisions to determine if they are “arbitrary and capricious.” This
is a familiar legal standard that applies across the federal government and affords
the executive branch significant deference, while still providing a meaningful check
on unreasoned, irrational, or arbitrary actions. Despite judicial fears of reviewing
foreign affairs questions, this approach is workable and is frequently used in cases
touching on foreign affairs and national security questions.25 Moreover, trade issues
are often mischaracterized as purely foreign affairs questions. But they also involve
core domestic economic policy questions. Indeed, the Constitution gives Congress
the explicit power to regulate “commerce with foreign nations” because the Founding
generation understood trade policy to be intricately tied to domestic economic affairs.
While Congress can and should directly oversee the President’s use of these delegated
authorities, it also has the power to direct the courts to engage in judicial review on
these issues.
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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

In section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, delete the language suggesting that the
President can direct the USTR (under our proposal, the Secretary of DEGS) to take
specific actions and add a provision making clear that actions taken under the
provision are not committed to agency discretion by law and are thus subject to
arbitrary and capricious review under 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A).

•

Revise section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to remove the role of the
President in making national security determinations and shaping remedies,
leaving the Secretary of Commerce’s decisions (under our proposal, the Secretary
of DEGS) as the final agency action. Add a provision stating that these decisions
are not committed to agency discretion by law and are thus subject to arbitrary and
capricious review under 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A).
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PART II: UNRIGGING
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
RECOMMENDATION 5

Condition Trade Agreements on Policies to Prevent
and Reform Tax Havens
One of the central problems of trade liberalization over the last generation is that it has
been lopsided. Capital has become far more mobile, allowing it to take advantage of
patchworks of national regulation. In no area is this more noticeable and problematic than
tax policy. In recent decades, the richest individuals and biggest companies have used tax
havens as a way to engage in widespread tax avoidance. According to Gabriel Zucman, an
economist at the University of California, Berkeley, the practice of reporting taxes through
tax havens, instead of within home countries, costs the United States $130 billion a year.26
This problem is not unique. In the United States, for example, the different states within
the Union need a way to allocate tax burdens among their different jurisdictions. Tax
scholars have applied this approach to the international context and proposed what they
call “formulary apportionment,” which means that taxable income will be determined
not based on where profits are reported as earned (i.e. the tax haven), but where the
products are actually sold.27
As a way to achieve formulary apportionment, trade expert Todd Tucker has argued
that trade negotiators should condition trade agreements on a country agreeing “to
implement formulary approaches, automatically share tax information, and maintain a
wealth registry of their corporations’ and citizens’ global assets.” If tax havens refuse, he
argues, “their financial institutions should be blocked from conducting business in the
trading bloc.” This would effectively force all tax havens into a formulary apportionment
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system, because companies would not be able to access the financial system.28 While
sanctions could be designed in a variety of ways, this one-two punch should allow the
United States to tackle the problem of tax havens effectively.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

The President should direct the Secretary of DEGS, with the assistance of the IRS and
the Secretary of the Treasury, to renegotiate trade agreements to include a formulary
apportionment system.

•

Congress should pass laws that enable a formulary apportionment system, put in place
economic sanctions that target favored trading partners that do not adopt such a system,
and support a wealth registry and any other necessary components of such a regime.

RECOMMENDATION 6

Restructure Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) allows private investors to bring lawsuits directly
against foreign governments and, if they win, obtain monetary damages that can run
into the millions or hundreds of millions of dollars. Historically, ISDS provided a recourse
for foreign investors to obtain redress for outright expropriations of their property in
countries that lacked strong, independent courts. For this reason, ISDS tended to be
limited to bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing countries. An
American company that owned an oil field in another country could seek damages if the
country nationalized the field. By ensuring foreign investors a judicial remedy comparable
to what they would have in, for instance, a U.S. court, ISDS provisions encouraged foreign
investment that proponents claim redounded to the benefit of both the foreign investors
and the country receiving the investment. American companies have benefitted from
ISDS provisions, obtaining millions of dollars in recovery from foreign governments.
Since the early years of ISDS, though, two things have changed. First, investment claims
often challenge so-called “indirect expropriations”—similar to regulatory takings in
domestic law—and violations of “fair and equitable treatment.” Unlike straightforward
expropriation claims, these claims frequently challenge some exercise of governmental
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regulatory authority. In perhaps the most egregious example, Phillip Morris brought
ISDS claims against both Uruguay and Australia challenging so-called “plain packaging”
rules for tobacco products, which aim to reduce smoking.29 Although such claims are
not usually successful absent a showing of discrimination or gross misconduct by the
host government, defending such suits is expensive and the possibility of suits may
cause regulatory chill, especially in smaller countries.
Second, ISDS (and investment provisions more generally) have been embedded in larger
free trade agreements, creating potential risks to the United States and asymmetries with
the broader aims of economic policy. Recent agreements often have multiple developed
countries as parties, meaning that investments flow in both directions in a way they
did not under older bilateral investment treaties. NAFTA 1994, with both Canada and
the United States as parties, offers the perfect example. Although the United States has
not yet lost an ISDS case, Canadian investors have regularly brought claims against the
United States under NAFTA 1994’s ISDS provisions. These cases have led the United
States to amend its model investment treaty over the years to reduce the risk that the
United States will lose a case, including by limiting the availability of ISDS to challenge
state and local measures.30
Embedding ISDS in trade agreements has also created an asymmetry. Only governments
can initiate disputes to enforce the trade, labor, or environment provisions of free trade
agreements, but investors retain the ability to initiate investment disputes. That means
most groups affected by trade agreements have to persuade their government to try to
vindicate their rights, an effort complicated by governments’ resource constraints and
diplomatic concerns. Well-resourced private investors, though, can bring a claim any
time they think they will win, or even just to pressure a government into settling.
ISDS procedures are also problematic. Under current rules, ISDS claims are usually heard
by ad hoc panels of three arbitrators appointed to hear individual cases. Arbitrators
are normally drawn from prominent international lawyers, professors, and former
government officials. In order to obtain lucrative appointments in future ISDS disputes,
many fear that arbitrators shade their decision to be either pro-investor or progovernment, since each party would normally pick one of the three arbitrators. Even
worse, practicing attorneys can appear before a tribunal in one arbitration and sit as an
arbitrator in another dispute. This fact has given rise to conflict of interest concerns.
Critics charge that lawyers with clients in one arbitration may carry their clients’
interests into a dispute in which the lawyer is supposed to sit as a neutral arbitrator.
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We can see two possible paths forward for reforming ISDS, and we present both as
options that might be appealing to policymakers depending on what is politically
viable. The first is to simply eliminate ISDS in all future agreements (or at least all future
trade agreements with developed countries) and seek to renegotiate prior agreements
to eliminate ISDS. The Trump Administration has taken a step in this direction by
eliminating ISDS in its NAFTA 2018 renegotiation with Canada and with Mexico for all
but a few sectors, such as extractives and telecommunications.31 While some might argue
that eliminating ISDS altogether serves little purpose because the United States has not
lost a case so far, there are other powerful arguments for abolishing this practice. First, as
currently implemented the practice is procedurally deficient. It also introduces into trade
agreements a private right of action available only to capital. Labor and environmental
groups are not able to bring international claims to enforce the labor and environmental
chapters of agreements before a panel of arbitrators that labor and environmental groups
help choose, and which can include, for instance, union lawyers. Second, ISDS can
be viewed as an implicit subsidy for American companies that seek to invest in risky
political environments. The U.S. government bears the diplomatic costs of securing
and preserving access to ISDS for private companies—a cost that can be significant
when our negotiating partners oppose ISDS, as for instance Australia and New Zealand
have at various times in connection with the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations.
U.S. companies can then invest abroad, a move that can involve shifting jobs overseas,
knowing that they potentially have an international remedy available.32 If a country’s
political and legal system is too risky for capital-intensive investments, the company
could either rely on political risk insurance or invest in a different country—one that has
a well-functioning judiciary and a commitment to the rule of law. Indeed, one of the
competitive advantages of the United States is our commitment to the rule of law.
The second approach is to reform the current ISDS system. Efforts to do so are already
under way,33 with many American allies favoring the creation of a standing global
investment court to replace the ad hoc tribunals that currently exist.34 Such a court,
modeled on the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, would regularize ISDS and remove
conflicts of interest by arbitrators. Although negotiations are ongoing, such a court
could contain both a trial level (or tribunal of first instance) and an appellate level,
allowing it to correct errors of law—a marked improvement on the current system. The
court would also be a standing body, comprised of highly qualified judges, selected by
governments, who would be strictly bound by ethical rules that would, most notably,
forbid them from acting as counsel in cases. Such a court could also include a robust
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mechanism for dismissing cases at an early stage, allowing governments to avoid
harassment through the filing of frivolous claim.
On this course of action, the United States should engage with this ongoing reform
process with an eye to influencing its outcomes. The United States’ objectives in these
negotiations should be three-fold. First, the United States should aggressively pursue
procedural reforms aimed at eliminating the perception of bias by arbitrators. A standing
investment court in which judges are chosen entirely by governments and are forbidden
from serving as advocates is one feasible way, although not the only way, to achieve this
objective. Imposing procedural predicates to arbitration—such as exhaustion of local
(i.e., domestic) remedies,35 or some form of international mediation as Todd Tucker as
proposed—may also make sense.36 Any future investment court should also have limited
jurisdiction, only able to hear cases under treaties that otherwise contain a right to ISDS.
In this way, the United States could control its exposure to ISDS through its individual
treaty negotiations, thereby vindicating the interest its businesses have in ensuring
widespread access to adequate judicial remedies abroad, while at the same time
protecting itself (and other governments) from frivolous claims by private investors.
Second, in future trade agreements the United States should restrict ISDS to businesses
that make country-specific investments that face particularly high and unavoidable
political and legal risks. This can be done in several ways. Both the Obama and Trump
Administrations have pursued a policy of sector-specific ISDS.37 Critics dislike these
sector-specific policies because they have an ad hoc feel and may appear to be choosing
winners and losers among industries. But certain industries, such as the extractive
sector, are constrained by geography in terms of the countries in which they can invest.
When large country-specific investments in physical and technological infrastructure
are made, these sectors face a higher risk of expropriation. ISDS might make sense
for these sectors because of the nature of the investments made and the heightened
risks involved in making them. Many other sectors, however, are neither constrained
in terms of where they invest, nor do they face unreasonable risks when they make
an investment. If an industry makes a product that has health effects, for instance,
that industry assumes the risk when it makes an investment that its product will be
regulated on the basis of its health effects. Excluding such a sector, like tobacco, from
ISDS represents an administrable way to protect the right to regulate in sensitive areas.
Reforms to substantive investment law—such as limiting what counts as an investment
or continuing to make clearer the narrow scope for successful indirect expropriation or
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fair and equitable treatment claims—offer another avenue to achieve the same end. The
United States also should consider whether ISDS is necessary at all in treaties between
countries with strong, independent domestic court systems. Historically, the benefit
of ISDS has been to provide a remedy for investors in countries that lack such a court
system. In treaties in which domestic courts provide an adequate remedy, given foreign
investors a second bite at the apple may be unwise.
Third, the United States should address the asymmetry that ISDS creates between capital
and labor and environmental concerns. We can imagine a number of resolutions to
this problem. On the one hand, a standing international court (whether an investment
court or a new court altogether) could be given jurisdiction to hear claims under the
labor and environment chapters of trade agreements brought by injured civil society
groups. The investment chapter is the only chapter in trade agreements with private
remedies because of investment law’s unique history, but that history need not limit
the imagination of future treaty negotiators. A more targeted alternative would be
incorporating into investment chapters themselves substantive labor and environmental
obligations that investors are expected to observe. Just as the labor and environment
chapters of trade agreements draw on nations’ international labor and environmental
obligations, these obligations on investors could draw on instruments like the OECD’s
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises or anticorruption norms like those reflected in
the OECD and UN anticorruption conventions. Failure to comply with these rules would
allow the government and third party intervenors to raise a counterclaim against the
investor that could result in damages against the investor.38

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Option 1: Do not include ISDS provisions in future trade and investment agreements
and renegotiate existing agreements to eliminate ISDS.

•

Option 2: Engage with the multilateral investment reform project, with the aim of
1) reforming the procedures under which ISDS occurs to address the perception of
bias in favor of corporate interests, 2) limiting the availability of ISDS to businesses
that make country-specific investments that are at particularly high and unavoidable
risk of expropriation, and 3) leveling the playing field between private investors and
other civil society groups that currently lack any ability directly to protect their own
interests in trade agreements.
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PART III: REDISTRIBUTION
WITHIN TRADE
RECOMMENDATION 7

Redesign Trade Remedies Laws
Trade remedies laws, primarily antidumping and countervailing duty laws, essentially
allow the government to impose extra tariffs on certain imported goods. Trade remedies
have been an especially important tool in protecting the American economy from
unfairly subsidized goods from China. Significant subsidies that are sometimes hard to
prove, along with the lack of an aggressive enforcement strategy, have allowed Chinese
businesses to sell manufactured goods into the U.S. market at deep discounts. While
these cheap products have benefitted the American consumer, they have come at the
expense of American producers. For products like solar panels, the result has been
Chinese dominance of the global marketplace.
For all the good they can do, though, trade remedies laws suffer from a number of
shortcomings. Chief among these is the problem of limited access and the resulting
uneven application of trade remedies in practice. Petitioning and persuading the
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission to impose trade
remedies is an expensive task, and thus not one open to small or even medium size
businesses or unions. Under current law, the Commerce Department has authority
to self-initiate investigations, but this authority is rarely used. The first proposal is
thus to create a central office, the Fair Trade Task Force, in the International Trade
Administration charged with monitoring the dumping and subsidization of all imported
products. The Fair Trade Task Force would collect and analyze data, and on the basis of
its research would recommend trade investigations that the government would selfinitiate. This proposal would be similar to a bipartisan bill introduced in the Senate, the
Self-Initiation Trade Enforcement Act. The Act could be strengthened in two ways. First,

© 2018

|

GREATDEMOCRACYINITIATIVE.ORG

28

the government should only self-initiate investigations when the investigation is in
the national interest. The Task Force’s recommendation should therefore explain why
the costs of imposing trade remedies flowing from a self-initiated investigation would
not outweigh the benefits to the protected companies. Second, the Act could constrain
the government’s discretion not to initiate a recommended investigation, such as by
requiring the government to initiate an investigation upon certain findings or requiring
an explanation for its decision to not initiate a recommended investigation.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION
Create a Fair Trade Task Force within the International Trade Administration tasked
with independently monitoring imports for evidence of dumping and subsidization that
cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry. Provide that the Task
Force shall recommend that the government self-initiate trade remedy investigations
that it determines are in the national interest upon finding evidence of dumping or
subsidization that does cause such injury.

RECOMMENDATION 8

Institute Social Dumping Rules
One of the major concerns with trade agreements is that they allow businesses to
offshore their operations to countries that have poor labor and environmental practices.
These poor practices reduce business costs, giving countries an incentive not to raise
their standards in order to attract foreign companies. Trade agreements attempt to solve
this problem by requiring countries to live up to international labor and environmental
standards, as established by international treaties. But those standards turn out to be very
difficult to enforce. They require the United States to initiate a formal dispute against
another country, and even then they are difficult to win because the United States must
show both the existence of poor labor or environmental practices and that the practices
adversely affect trade. Indeed, to date the United States has only brought a single formal
dispute under these labor and environment chapters. During that case, it encountered
substantial difficulties producing evidence, because witnesses in Guatemala, the
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respondent country, feared retaliation if their identities became public. And the United
States eventually lost because it could not demonstrate that Guatemala’s failure to
enforce labor rules adversely impacted trade.40
To be sure, amendments to the labor and environmental chapters of trade agreements
can address some of these concerns, such as by making anonymous evidence easier to
introduce to show labor violations, or by eliminating the requirement that governments
demonstrate that labor violations affect trade. But the surest way to respond to these
concerns is through anti-dumping laws. Such laws already provide a mechanism under
both domestic U.S. law and international trade agreements to impose additional duties
on products that are unfairly priced. Moreover, they do not require international dispute
resolution before being imposed. Instead, U.S. persons can petition the Commerce
Department (now the DEGS under our proposal) to impose duties. The imposition of
duties follows determinations that the Commerce Department and the International
Trade Commission are required to make by law, and which are reviewable in federal court.
Expanding anti-dumping laws to respond to so-called “social dumping” ensures that
foreign products produced through poor labor and environmental practices cannot, by
virtue of those practices, undercut U.S. producers in the U.S. market. By negating the
cost advantages of poor labor and environmental practices, social dumping rules can
protect the United States’ commitment to only having products available in its markets
that are produced in accordance with global labor and environmental norms. Social
dumping rules would also provide labor and environmental groups a private right of
action that would compel the U.S. government to take action enforcing the existing
labor and environmental provisions in U.S. trade agreements.
Here’s how social dumping rules would work. Any affected party—importers, exporters,
domestic producers, labor unions, consumer or environmental groups, or other civil
society organizations—would be able to file a petition with DEGS to initiate a social
dumping investigation. If the resulting investigation determined that imports were 1)
produced in violation of labor or environmental norms, and 2) and that those imports
caused “material injury” to a domestic industry, the government would be authorized
to impose additional duties on the import of the product. As Professor Gregory Shaffer,
who has put forward the most comprehensive social dumping proposal, has argued, this
kind of regime builds on the current architecture and procedures for anti-dumping laws,
and is therefore easily workable.41
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More specifically, a social dumping regime would have to specify the kinds of activity
subject to social dumping duties. The labor and environment chapters of U.S. trade
agreements already provide a list of such activities, however. The list of activities qualifying
for social dumping duties should include any conduct in violation of these international
norms. After a showing of material injury, or the threat thereof, to a domestic industry
as a result of a violation of those domestic rules, the government could impose tariffs on
the imported products “up to the amount that would offset the injury that the increased
imports from the country in question cause or threaten to cause.”42 As Shaffer notes, such
a regime would both avoid the cumbersome process of winning an international dispute
before imposing duties, and would also avoid the evidentiary burden of proving a causal
link between a violation of labor and environmental rules and trade effects. Instead, it
would be sufficient to show a correlation between a violation of the rules and an increase
in cheap imports that threatens or causes material injury to a domestic injury.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Amend U.S. anti-dumping laws to permit claims for social dumping. Specifically,
antidumping laws should be amended to allow any affected party to petition the
DEGS to impose social dumping duties when the violation of international labor and
environmental norms (at a minimum, those already protected by U.S. trade agreements)
corresponds with “material injury” or the threat thereof to a domestic industry.

•

Renegotiate the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement, and anti-dumping rules in U.S.
trade agreements, to permit social dumping duties consistent with the amendments
to U.S. antidumping rules.

RECOMMENDATION 9

Create Development Chapters
for Developed Countries
Historically, trade agreements have been used primarily to regulate tariff rates among
countries. After the Second World War, the early GATT negotiating rounds focused
primarily on tariff reductions. By the 1970s, however, tariffs had already been reduced
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among developed countries to such extent that nations began looking to liberalize socalled “non-tariff” barriers to trade. The result, embodied in the many WTO agreements
that came into force in 1995 as well as modern free trade agreements, is that trade
agreements now do far more than regulate tariffs. They 1) establish rules for trade in
services, which for covered sectors include matters as mundane as professional licensing;
2) require minimum levels of intellectual property protection that allow IP-rich companies
to both capture monopoly profits in overseas markets and also outsource the production
of their products without fear of losing their proprietary technology; 3) create presumptive
international standards for food safety regulation; 4) limit the kinds of labeling rules
governments can apply; 5) protect private investment through ISDS; 6) require countries
to adhere to international labor and environmental standards, and so much more. In
other words, trade agreements are no longer limited to regulating only, or even primarily,
government action about trade. As Chief Justice John Marshall recognized about the
Constitution’s Commerce Clause nearly 200 years ago, the regulation of commerce cannot
be limited “to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities.” Rather, “[i]t describes
the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches”.43
In an era in which the United States’ trade agreements have traveled the path of federal
regulation of interstate commerce, sweeping in ever-broader subjects, it might seem
strange indeed to hear pundits or policymakers argue that a certain subject is too far
removed from trade to be included in a trade agreement. Yet neoliberalism’s defenders
often make exactly this claim. They argue that trade agreements should be limited to
“trade” concerns, often understood to mean obligations that advance the interests of U.S.
businesses exclusively.
This distinction can no longer stand. Trade agreements are not confined only to “trade”
objectives, and these agreements have significant impacts on a variety domestic
economic and social welfare objectives. Indeed, voters have made absolutely clear that
they no longer view the market as an appropriate means of allocating the gains from trade
liberalization. And why should they? The idea of trickle-down economics—that the market
fairly allocates the benefits from tax cuts to the wealthy—has been discredited in most
circles. Why then would we adhere to an outdated notion that the market fairly allocates
the gains from trade, and hence trade agreements should not themselves attempt to
do so? Labor and environmental chapters in trade agreements were an early attempt
to address these distributional issues by negating any comparative advantage other
countries might gain from circumventing international labor and environmental rules.
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But these rules have not succeeded, both because they are difficult to enforce and because
they do not directly address distributional issues within the massive U.S. economy.44
International trade agreements should include rules requiring governments, including
developed countries, to take steps to monitor and address domestic inequality arising
from trade liberalization. These obligations should be embodied in a Development
Chapter in future trade agreements, and they should include two sets of obligations.
First, governments should be required to monitor the regional, local, and sectoral
effects of trade liberalization. Collecting such data, which would not noticeably increase
the burden on the U.S. government, would provide a more accurate picture of which
communities are winning from trade liberalization and which are losing. Governments
should then be required to report to a treaty monitoring body the measures they are
taking to redistribute the gains from trade to those adversely impacted by trade. This
kind of monitoring and reporting mechanism is already found in the WTO’s Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, and is also common in human rights agreements. Expanding
such mechanisms to include distributional effects and programs to address those effects
should be an easy step.

International trade agreements should include
rules requiring governments, including developed
countries, to take steps to monitor and address
domestic inequality arising from trade liberalization.
Second, a Development Chapter should include obligations on governments to
affirmatively spend money in support of programs that redistribute to those harmed by
trade liberalization. These obligations should be flexible. Governments should be free to
adapt their spending programs to their particular national and regional circumstances.
Programs that would qualify would include traditional trade adjustment assistance
programs, as well as broader infrastructure, education, and social welfare spending that
creates economic opportunities for those displaced by trade liberalization. Moreover,
the obligation should be tied to the amount of dislocation governments find pursuant
to their monitoring and reporting obligations. If it is really true that trade liberalization
lifts all boats, then governments would not be required to spend. More likely, if
trade liberalization does harm particular communities, governments would have to
implement programs to assist those communities.
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Although new, this proposal would build on a Development Chapter included in
the Trans Pacific Partnership. That chapter contained no binding obligations, but
established institutions that could be a model for the treaty monitoring bodies
established by a new Development Chapter. It also contained hortatory obligations to
invest in things like infrastructure and education. Those obligations would be elaborated
and made more stringent, a significant step forward towards making trade agreements
work for all Americans in the 21st century. And by doing so, a Development Chapter
could ensure that all American have an interest in seeing a new, fair trade regime thrive.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Include a Development Chapter in future trade agreements that requires countries to
monitor the impact of trade agreements on a regional, local, and sectoral level, and
report on the measures the government is taking to address any harm or economic
dislocation caused within regions, localities, and sectors.

•

Include in the Development Chapter positive obligations on governments to expend
government revenue on programs to assist any region, locality, or employees within
a sector harmed by trade liberalization. The obligation should be flexible, allowing
governments to fulfill it through a wide range of programs, including spending
on education, infrastructure, or classic trade adjustment assistance programs. The
obligation should also be tied to the findings of the monitoring process, such that a
country that finds greater localized harms from trade liberalization would be required
to take greater steps to address those harms.

RECOMMENDATION 10

Tax the Winners of Trade
Trade agreements are usually justified on the grounds that they create broad-based
economic growth from which all gain. But even when the growth is not evenly
distributed, the argument is that the growth will be so significant that the winners from
trade could compensate the losers and there would still be net benefits for the country.
The trouble is that while trade liberalization creates disproportionate gains for some,
trade agreements have not been tied to policies that compensate the losers of trade. For
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the wealth generated from trade to really benefit everyone, governments will have to
take more aggressive steps to ensure that it is shared among a broad base of citizens.
International trade agreements provide an ideal vehicle for coordinating governments’
efforts on taxing the gains from trade to ensure an equitable distribution and thus,
ultimately, the security of the trading system as a whole.
There are many ways to link taxes and trade. We offer two possible options for
policymakers. The first is to couple trade agreements with a winners-tax. The
International Trade Commission already conducts studies on which sectors will
benefit and which will be harmed from particular trade agreements. Based on this
information, the winning sectors should have to pay a tax, the proceeds of which
would be automatically put into a Trade Adjustment Fund that would be allocated to
trade adjustment assistance, economic development and industrial policy, or other
redistributive programs that seek to mitigate the harm to the losers from the agreement.
This could be implemented as a sector-specific excise tax, or as Thomas Streinz has
suggested, by “condition[ing] certain benefits transnational business actors receive from
[free trade agreements] on obtaining a ‘free trade passport’ in exchange for a fee.”45
Of course, taxes need not be directly tied to the agreements themselves. For example,
one of us has called for imposing a financial transaction tax (FTT) throughout the
area covered by a free trade agreement.46 FTTs are enormously successful at raising
revenue and feasible as a policy option. The congressional Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated that a proposed FTT in the United States would have raised $180 billion
between 2015 and 2023.47 A number of large financial centers, such as Hong Kong,
Mumbai and Seoul, currently have FTTs in place, collectively raising over $15 billion per
year.48 Moreover, in Europe, ten EU member countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain,
Austria, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have announced plans to
implement an FTT to help states recoup some of the losses from the many bailouts
within Europe.49 These taxes are also so small—usually somewhere between .01% and
.1% of different kinds of financial transactions—that they do not distort market behavior.
An FTT should be designed to tax wholesale capital market transactions (stocks, bonds,
derivatives and currency trades) between major financial institutions such as banks,
investment firms, insurance companies, pension funds, and hedge funds. The FTAA
would not apply to “retail” transactions, such as home mortgages and business loans. So
targeted, an FTT raises revenue from the kinds of financial transactions—such as the sale
or purchase of securities or bonds—that reflect much of the underlying value created
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by trade liberalization. An FTT thus would allow countries to tax the capital that benefits
most from trade liberalization, without interfering with the considerably larger number
of businesses that buy and sell goods and services within a free trade area.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
•

Option 1: Future trade agreements, or renegotiated trade agreements, should include
a provision imposing a tax on sectors that the ITC estimates will be the winners from
trade agreements, and that tax should go into a Trade Adjustment Fund that would
be allocated to trade adjustment assistance, economic development and industrial
policy programs, or other redistributive measures.

•

Option 2: Future trade agreements, or renegotiated trade agreements, should include
a provision imposing a financial transaction tax within all the member states, with
the revenue raised in each jurisdiction earmarked to fund programs addressing
the harms caused by trade liberalization. The tax should be no more than .1% of the
value of covered financial transactions—including the sale of securities, bonds, and
currency — within the free trade area. The tax should apply to any transaction by a
covered entity, meaning a major financial institution located in at least one of the
member states of the free trade area.
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